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Abstract
In 2010, amidst the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis, the launching of a novel European strategy for 
“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” signalled 
a significant step in the European coordination 
strategies for tackling poverty and social exclusion. 
Crucial in this respect is the unprecedented 
prominence accorded to a quantified goal in 
poverty reduction across the EU, to be achieved by 
2020, along a supranational governance process 
that sets the ambitious aim of bringing the social 
field within the framework of EU financial and 
economic governance. In this paper, we critically 
examine how this new strategy has fared so far and 
what the expectations are for its effectiveness in 
combating poverty and social exclusion within the 
set timeframe.
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part 
we briefly discuss the main dimensions of the EU 
2020 Strategy and the targets and tools in the fight 
against poverty and social exclusion. In the second 
part we scrutinize the relevant literature on the 
political dynamics behind the EU targets and policy 
tools with a focus on the conflicts and opposing 
normative visions of poverty and social exclusion 
among member states and EU bodies, which erect 
serious barriers to effective anti-poverty policies 
across the EU. This is combined with an analysis of 
the European coordination mechanisms in the social 
field, with an emphasis on the European Semester 
and the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) 
by the European Commission and the Council of the 
European Union. 
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In the third part we present and discuss the 
outcomes so far, on the basis of the three 
components of the poverty and social exclusion 
measure used by the European Commission: The 
at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP), i.e. the relative 
poverty measure based on disposable income; severe 
material deprivation (SMD); and joblessness (LWI), 
i.e. people living in households with zero or low 
work intensity. In 2014, about 122 million people 
were at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion, well 
above the pre-crisis level. Moreover, in a number 
of member countries income thresholds under 
which people live in relative poverty have fallen 
significantly, indicating a pronounced deterioration 
in living standards. Severe material deprivation 
remains above the 2009 level, and has greatly 
increased in countries like Greece and Spain, which 
have been severely hit by the economic crisis, but 
also in the UK. Equally, the share of people living 
in jobless households is on the ascent (11.1 % in 
2014, well above the pre-crisis level). We examine 
the factors accounting for this poor performance 
of the EU 2020 Strategy in the social field and 
comment upon the multi-stakeholder involvement 
in the governance process of the EU anti-poverty 
targets. The conclusion briefly reflects upon how to 
strengthen the European anti-poverty dimension.
outcomes so far, and the prospects for effectively 
combating poverty and social exclusion within 
the set timeframe. Our major findings are the 
following: There are strong disagreements and 
opposing normative visions of poverty and social 
exclusion among EU countries. These erect serious 
barriers to social inclusion, greatly accentuated by 
the dwindling public support for the EU and rising 
Euroscepticism over the last few years. The data 
show that more people live in poverty and social 
exclusion than pre-crisis, and inequality within MS 
and across the EU has increased significantly. The 
new governance framework has triggered multi-
stakeholder engagement at various levels (regional, 
national supranational) with regard to the anti-
poverty target. This is a positive development for 
increasing the visibility of the social field in the 
EU. Yet, it can hardly guarantee meeting the anti-
poverty target, as long as social considerations 
remain subordinate to economic and fiscal priorities 
in the EU.      
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part 
we briefly discuss the main dimensions of the 
EU 2020 Strategy and the targets and tools in the 
fight against poverty and social exclusion. The 
second part focuses on the political dynamics 
underlying the formulation of the EU anti-poverty 
target (among MS, the European Commission, the 
Council, the European Parliament, the Employment 
Committee, the Social Protection Committee and 
other relevant bodies), and how this has impacted 
upon target setting by each MS in the yearly policy 
cycles of the “Strategy” (from 2011 to 2016). The 
third part briefly examines the outcomes so far in 
respect to poverty and social exclusion among MS, 
and critically discusses how and to what extent 
the European Commission and the Council have 
responded to rising poverty in their latest Country 
Reports and Country Specific Recommendations. It 
also comments upon multi-stakeholder involvement 
in the governance process of the EU anti-poverty 
targets. The conclusion stresses the need for a set 
of binding social rights at the EU level in order to 
strengthen the European social dimension.
The main dimensions of the EU 2020
Strategy and the poverty reduction 
target
As Scharf (2002: 645) stresses, the EU suffers 
from “a constitutional asymmetry between 
Introduction
In 2010, amidst the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis, the launching of a novel European strategy for 
“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” signalled 
a significant step in the European coordination 
strategies for tackling poverty and social exclusion.  
Crucial in this respect is the unprecedented 
prominence accorded to a quantified goal in poverty 
reduction across the EU, to be achieved by 2020, 
along a supranational governance process that 
sets the ambitious aim of bringing the social field 
within the framework of EU financial and economic 
governance.  
In this paper we critically examine the place of 
the anti-poverty dimension in the governance of 
the EU 2020 Strategy1, the conflicting perspectives 
and priorities among member states (MS) and EU 
authorities that impacted upon the content of the 
target, its implementation and monitoring, the 
1  Referred to below also as the “Strategy”.
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policies promoting market efficiencies and policies 
promoting social protection and equality”.  The EU 
2020 Strategy has initially been heralded as a step 
forward in bringing the social dimension into the 
process of economic and financial EU integration. 
It was particularly welcomed as an important 
development towards tackling poverty (Marlier 
et al., 2010) and hence “as a major brick of ‘Social 
Europe’ for decades” (Armstrong, 2010).  It succeeds 
the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010), in the sense that 
it builds in particular upon the policy toolkit and 
major objectives of the revised Lisbon Strategy (in 
2005) that emphasized growth and jobs. Its major 
innovation lies in the introduction of a specific 
quantitative target for reducing poverty and social 
exclusion by 2020, as well as in the introduction of 
a novel governance arm (the European Semester)2 
2  The “European Semester” refers to the annual cycle of 
the governance process in the EU. Every year, it starts with 
for policy coordination and monitoring that could, 
potentially, facilitate a deeper integration between 
the social, economic and financial dimensions of the 
Union. 
Very briefly, the EU 2020 Strategy is set around 
three major priorities: of “smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”. The overall governance structure 
consists of three major pillars (or strands): macro-
the drafting of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) by the 
Commission, which sets out the key policy challenges and 
priorities across the three strands of EU governance (macro-
economic, fiscal and thematic; see below). Member states then 
prepare their National Reform Programmes and Stability 
and Convergence Programmes, in which they assess their 
policy performance and set out their future actions.  These 
programmes are discussed by EU-level expert committees and 
EU bodies, which provide input to the Commission for issuing 
the Country Specific Recommendations. The latter, after being 
adopted by the Council of the EU, feed into the following 
annual cycle.  
Table 1: The structure of the EU 2020 Strategy (the “Thematic Strand”)
Goals & policy 
tools
Three major priorities pointing to the nature of growth that EU envisages: 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth
1st tier
Five headline targets (to be translated into national targets)
Employment
75% of the 20-
64 year-olds to 
be employed
R&D
3% of the EU's 







-20% of energy 
from renewables





rates of early 
school leaving 
below 10% 







at least 20 
million fewer 





Ten integrated guidelines - Four guidelines concern macro-economic & fiscal surveillance 
(not depicted here). Six guidelines refer to thematic coordination, as follows:
Two on labour 








3rd tier Seven flagship initiatives to encourage progress on the guidelines 
Smart growth
• Digital Agenda for Europe
• Innovation Union




• Resource efficient Europe












Source: Compiled by the author.
Figure 1: Combinations of the constituents of the AROPE indicator (million of people, 
2008 & 2014)
            
             
           








Source: Eurostat data in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators accessed 10 October
2016. 
Note: 
                      2008 2014
                Population                        Population
At-risk-of-poverty: 81.3 million At-risk-of-poverty: 85.4 million
Experiencing severe material Experiencing severe material
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economic coordination (with a focus on preventing 
or correcting macro-economic imbalances); fiscal 
surveillance (strongly limiting national control 
of public finances mainly in the Euro area); and 
thematic coordination.3 The “Thematic Strand” 
(Table 1) embraces five “interrelated headline 
targets” to be achieved by 2020, in the fields of 
employment, research and development, climate 
change and energy, education and the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion. The targets are 
further dissected into six guidelines of “thematic 
coordination”. These are combined with four major 
targets (not depicted in Table 1), which concern 
macro-economic and fiscal surveillance aligned to 
the fiscal stipulations of the Stability and Growth 
Pact.4
In order to promote progress with respect to these 
priorities and major targets, the Commission put 
forward seven “flagship initiatives” consisting 
of specific work programmes that could act as 
levers of change along the set goals. Within this 
framework, at least in rhetoric, the anti-poverty and 
social inclusion policies have gained a significant 
prominence, given the fact that they figure as one of 
the five key goals of this supranational endeavour. 
Thus, the “vague objective” of eradicating poverty 
under the “Lisbon Strategy” has been replaced “by a 
possibly less ambitious, but potentially more incisive, 
quantified poverty target” (Jessoula et al., 2015: 6), 
namely to lift 20 million people out of poverty and 
social exclusion by 2020.  Moreover, among the 
seven European flagship initiatives, the “European 
Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion” was 
introduced with the aim of supporting the EU and 
MS to reach the anti-poverty and social inclusion 
target. This was conceived as an umbrella platform 
for an exchange of good practice and encouragement 
of multi-level, multi-stakeholder involvement.
The Lisbon Strategy was equally a significant 
moment in respect to the social dimension of the 
EU, as it brought forward the social integration 
3  For a more detailed description of the governance 
architecture of the EU, see Vanhercke 2011, 2013; also http://
ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/annex_swd_implementation_
last_version_15-07-2010.pdf accessed 15 September 2016.
4  That, however, together with macro-economic surveillance, 
outweighs the thematic coordination targets. Fiscal surveillance 
under the Stability and Growth Pact is not integrated into the 
EU 2020 Guidelines, but runs parallel to it.
goal, albeit in a vague way, but with the 2005 review 
this goal significantly faded away. The use of the 
so-called “Open Method of Coordination”5 in the 
social field (the social OMCs) launched with the 
Lisbon Strategy stimulated mutual learning through 
national and joint reports, and related indicators. 
However, as stressed in the relevant literature, by 
the end of the period to which the Lisbon Strategy 
referred hardly any of its objectives were met. 
Rather, “the gap between the best and the worst 
performing Member States” was wider in 2010 than 
in 2000 (Tilfor and Whyte, 2010: 3). 
A significant element of the EU 2020 Strategy 
is the introduction of an iterative process under 
the “European Semester” which, as mentioned 
above, embraces a cycle of national reporting and 
monitoring that integrates the previously separate 
strands of macro-economic surveillance and 
the country reporting under the Lisbon Strategy 
(mainly the employment and social OMCs). These 
are combined in the annual National Reform 
Programmes of the MS. During the “European 
Semester” the relevant bodies of the European 
Commission monitor progress with respect to 
set priorities and targets, provide annual policy 
guidance and issue specific recommendations to MS, 
as briefly stated above.  
A major question that arises is whether the novel 
framework constitutes an effective move forward 
in drastically tackling poverty and social exclusion 
in the EU or, as with the Lisbon Strategy, it will 
hardly deliver in this respect. By drawing upon the 
existing literature and in the light of the available 
data and indicators so far, we attempt to assess 
this issue along the following lines. We trace the 
political dynamics in the relevant EU institutions for 
setting the anti-poverty and social inclusion goal. 
Major politico-ideological differences in the way 
the MS, the Commission and other EU institutions 
approach social welfare are revealing as regards 
the possibility of clearly articulating and effectively 
pursuing a common anti-poverty target. Also, we 
assess outcomes so far on the basis of the combined 
5  In the EU governance architecture, the OMC is placed 
in-between hard and soft law. It is a policy instrument that is 
less effective in bringing about concrete outcomes than hard 
law; but more effective in triggering cognitive shifts than soft 
law, particularly due to the regular reporting, peer review and 
mutual learning processes accompanying it (Zeitlin et al., 2005; 
Trubek et al., 2006). 
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indicator agreed at the EU level for measuring 
poverty and/or social exclusion (and its component 
parts), and briefly comment on whether there are 
any indications of truly promoting integration 
between macro-economic, financial and anti-
poverty policies.  The latter issue reveals the place of 
anti-poverty policies in Europe 2020.  
The political dynamics regarding the EU 
anti-poverty dimension
The available literature (see among others 
Copeland and Daly, 2012 and 2014; Copeland, 
2014; Frazer et al., 2014; Marlier and Natali, 
2010) on the negotiations and the final inclusion 
of the anti-poverty dimension in Europe 2020 
highlights various aspects of the political dynamics 
surrounding the process. Of particular importance 
in this respect are the inherent discrepancies in the 
definition of the target itself and in the way these 
impact upon the governance of the “Strategy”. 
The academic debate emphasizes a number of crucial 
levers influencing the decision by the Commission, 
the MS and the Council on the major thematic 
priorities of Europe 2020. First, the criticisms of 
the re-launched Lisbon Strategy (Lisbon II, 2005 
to 2010)6 expressed by “socially oriented actors” 
(i.e. experts from academia supporting “Social 
Europe”, a small group of transnational NGOs – 
like the European Anti-poverty Network [EAPN] 
– lobbying for anti-poverty measures, European 
Parliament majority votes in favour of integrating 
the social and economic dimension and others) 
strongly emphasized the subordinate place of the 
social dimension in EU integration. These actors 
argued against the separation of social policy 
on the one hand from economic, monetary and 
employment policies on the other. Copeland (2014: 
175) stresses particularly the importance of the 
politics surrounding the re-election of Manuel 
Barroso as head of the Commission in 2009, namely 
his attempt to respond to the European Parliament’s 
criticism that during his previous term in office EU 
6  As Copeland argues (2014: 166) “while the Lisbon Strategy 
initially prioritised tackling social exclusion [….] [its re-launch 
in 2005] under the banner of ‘Growth and Jobs’ effectively side-
lined the open method of coordination in social inclusion […..] 
[and] was reconfigured around the liberal aim whereby social 
cohesion was articulated as a result of economic growth and 
employment, rather than being an independent objective in its 
own right” (see also Daly, 2012; Haar and Copeland, 2010).
policies under Lisbon II focused heavily “on business 
interests rather than all EU citizens”. Second, 
during the time of the negotiations of the EU 
2020 Strategy, a small group of MS in the Council 
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) strongly supported the inclusion of the 
social component in the broad process of European 
integration. They were opposed mainly by Sweden, 
the UK, Ireland and the new member countries 
(the Central and East European Countries - CEEs), 
which vehemently insisted on the restricted legal 
competence of the EU in the social protection field. 
Strikingly, behind the convergence on this stance, 
among the above countries, lie different political 
economies and welfare approaches: Sweden, a 
country with a social-democratic welfare state, 
stood together with the neo-liberal view of the UK, 
Ireland and most of the CEEs. The stance supported 
by this group of countries stressed employment 
growth as the main tool for tackling poverty and 
social exclusion. Yet, at a closer look, behind this 
common stance lie different normative perspectives. 
In Sweden, redistribution through a “solidaristic” 
welfare state that relies extensively on public 
employment for social service provision, limits the 
prevalence of the poverty issue in public debate. 
As stressed in the available literature, high levels of 
public service employment do not leave much room 
for low-paid service jobs and related poverty traps, 
while labour market integration policies are directly 
linked to social inclusion. In the countries with a 
neo-liberal political orientation (as well as in most of 
the CEEs) benefit/welfare dependency takes centre 
stage in public debate as a major cause of poverty. 
Activation for labour market integration is crucial 
in this welfare philosophy as well, but contrary to 
Sweden, state involvement and support are limited, 
mostly addressed to those in great need (Copeland 
and Daly, 2012: 277-8). Also, CEEs expressed major 
concern regarding the financial costs that they 
would incur through any social protection measures 
agreed at the EU level. 
In a third group of countries, the South European 
countries, poverty has persistently been high. But, 
until the current crisis, it had not been a particularly 
prevalent issue in public debate, in the context of 
the familialistic welfare pattern and the limited 
redistribution though social welfare institutions in 
these countries (Petmesidou, 2013). Moreover, the 
crisis in Southern Europe strengthened the CEEs’ 
argument that any decisions at the supranational 
level triggering the expansion of social spending 
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would negatively affect their public finances, 
given the fact that their GDP per capita levels are 
much lower than those of West European MS. On 
the other hand, North-West European countries 
considered any binding anti-poverty target as 
opening up the way for an expansion of the 
Commission’s competences in the social field and 
hence for social redistribution at the supranational 
level (Copeland and Daly, 2012). 
Overall, there are cross-cutting lines of alliances 
and clashes among MS as to their assessment of the 
significance of the poverty issue and the ways to 
combat it.  This highly limits the appeal of a binding 
EU-wide poverty benchmark. The political stripe of 
the government in power is crucial too for defining 
support of or opposition to a common stance on 
poverty across the EU.  Nevertheless, after a period 
of stumbling negotiations, a convergence on the 
view of prioritizing employment growth as the 
major tool for combating poverty offered the way 
out of the impasse.   The Spanish presidency during 
the first half of 2010 succeeded in incorporating the 
anti-poverty and social inclusion target in the main 
objectives of the “Strategy”. Yet, this was a target of 
low expectations and high controversies that allow 
great scope for different national interpretations of 
what is required for it to be attained and how it can 
be achieved.7  This brings us to our second point, 
namely the articulation of the anti-poverty target 
in this new framework and the governance of its 
implementation. 
A brief review of the negotiations (Copeland, 2014) 
on how to define the anti-poverty target shows a 
strong disagreement among MS in the Council, and 
between the European Commission’s Directorate for 
Employment and Social Affairs and the Directorate 
for Economic and Financial Affairs.  This reflects 
diversity in normative perspectives to social policy 
linked to the diversity in the European welfare 
states, as mentioned above. Given, also, the limited 
scope of the “social acquis” and the restricted 
legal competence of EU institutions in the social 
domain, the social dimension is a contentious issue 
making agreements fragile and subject to political 
expediency on all sides. All these are critical issues 
7  In a sense this perpetuates a condition highly prevalent also 
in the context of the Lisbon Strategy (see Larocque and Noël, 
2014, on the different interpretations of common objectives by 
MS under the OMC on social inclusion). 
for assessing the poverty and social exclusion target.
The first draft proposal by the Commission set 
a rather bold poverty reduction target of 25% by 
2020 (European Commission, 2010a: 5). Only 
seven MS supported this proposal (four South 
European countries – Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Cyprus – together with Austria and Belgium). 
Most MS expressed strong worries about what 
they considered an imposition by the Commission 
in an area pertaining to national jurisdiction on 
policy decision. The fear of intrusion into national 
policy domains was further exacerbated by the 
new monitoring and governance tools that might 
embrace binding country-specific recommendations 
by the EU institutions. Negotiations led the 
Commission to come up with a watered-down 
target, accompanied by reassurances that the anti-
poverty guideline and the monitoring of its progress 
would not be of a binding character for MS. The 
EU anti-poverty reduction target was redefined. 
It embraced a much larger reference population 
than the people living in conditions of relative 
poverty (the cut-off point set at 60% of the median 
equivalized disposable income from every source, 
after social transfers)8, with the addition of people 
experiencing social exclusion and/or living in jobless 
households. The target was also defined in absolute 
numbers rather than as a percentage reduction: 
namely to reduce the number of people in the 
above reference group by 20 million by 2020 (which 
comprises about 17% of the reference population, in 
the baseline year [2008]9, as the reference population 
increased from about 81 to 116.6 million people). 
The broadening of the reference population was 
accompanied by a re-articulation of the indicator 
to be used for monitoring progress. The new 
indicator is composed of three components. In 
addition to the at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP, i.e. 
the relative poverty rate), the components of severe 
material deprivation (SMD) and of joblessness 
(LWI, low work intensity) were also included to 
form the composite AROPE indicator. The SMD 
component refers to deprivation in relation to the 
“customary standard of life” and is defined as the 
number of people who lack at least four out of nine 
8  This indicator was already agreed under the Lisbon Strategy. 
9  The EU 2020 Strategy was launched in 2010, but the Eurostat 
data on poverty and social exclusion available at that time 
referred to 2008.
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refers to the neo-liberal activation perspective. It 
shifts emphasis from unemployment in itself to 
the intergenerational cycle with demotivation and 
disengagement being built-up and transmitted 
within the family. This requires policies “to make 
people in these households available for employment 
and wanting to be employed” (Copeland and Daly, 
2014: 356). According to the latter authors, the 
“joblessness” component of the anti-poverty target 
constitutes a cultural element, in the sense that 
“worklessness” is perceived as a characteristic of 
a specific type of family with corrosive effects on 
people, and particularly on children (Copeland 
and Daly, 2012: 281). They also stress the potential 
of the term to hinge on the issue “of the growing 
polarization of labour markets, especially as regards 
having a job at all and the quality of that job”, and 
thus to appeal to a broad political spectrum in the 
EU (ibid.).  Notably, the countries in favour of the 
inclusion of the anti-poverty target in the EU 2020 
Strategy expressed a critical stance as to the latter 
component of the AROPE indicator, considering it 
“an empty target”, on the grounds that in the neo-
liberal economies a working-poor type phenomenon 
is widespread (affecting close to 10% of persons who 
items defined, EU-wide, as basic constituents of a 
condition of deprivation.10 In addition to adequate 
income for improving living standards, this 
component touches upon the role of social services, 
education and decent work opportunities. The third 
component refers to people living in households 
with zero or very low work intensity.11 This strongly 
10  These items are: (1) to pay rent, mortgage or utility bills; 
(2) to keep home adequately warm; (3) to face unexpected 
expenses; (4) to eat meat or proteins regularly; (5) to go on 
holiday; (6) to have a television set; (7) to have a washing 
machine, (8) to have a car; (9) to have a telephone. The 
indicator differentiates people who cannot afford these goods 
or services from those who do not need or want them. The 
concept of social exclusion has been promoted by the European 
Commission since the 1980s. But until the run-up to Europe 
2020 no agreement on this dimension could be reached 
(Copeland and Daly, 2012: 280).
11  This dimension is measured among working age 
respondents (up to 59 years). People over the age of 59 are 
considered “at-risk-of-poverty and/or social exclusion” only if 
they live under conditions of “monetary poverty” or “severe 
material deprivation”.
Figure 1: Combinations of the constituents of the AROPE indicator (millions of 
people, 2008 & 2014) 
            
             
            








Source: Eurostat data in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators accessed 10 
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were at work in the EU27, in 2015).12 De Graaf-Zijl 
and Nolan (2011) indicate that although there is a 
strong relationship between income poverty and 
material deprivation, this is not the case with “low 
work intensity”. As shown in Figure 1, persistently 
about one third of people living in households 
with low work intensity experience neither income 
poverty nor material deprivation. 
Nolan and Whelan (2011: 16) show that people 
classified as being low in work intensity are highly 
differentiated, as about a quarter come from a 
professional and managerial background and about 
43% from a working-class background. Hence they 
argue that this third component of the AROPE 
indicator should not be taken as a measure of 
poverty per se but as a condition that could lead to 
poverty and deprivation. In the light of this, policy 
measures targeting low-work intensity households 
“will not contribute hugely to reducing poverty and 
material deprivation and vice versa” (Copeland and 
Daly, 2014: 357).
Moreover, the broadening of the poverty indicator 
was accompanied with significant flexibility in the 
way the guideline for attaining the EU 2020 target 
can be translated into the national policies: MS 
can choose one, all three or a combination of the 
AROPE components, and, as we shall see below, 
some MS can even choose indicators outside the 
AROPE indicator scope. In principle, the national 
targets should add up to the quantitative target 
set for the EU as a whole, but there are no binding 
commitments for this. Markedly, the suggestion by 
the Commission to disaggregate the EU-wide target 
into region-specific targets met the disagreement of 
several MS and was dropped (Renda, 2014).    
The composite indicator emerged as a compromise 
between the normative perspectives of the various 
actors. According to some authors (Hyman, 2011; 
Copeland and Daly, 2012 and 2014; Frazer et al., 
2014), the compromise clearly stresses a glaring 
controversy over the social dimension of the EU: 
while the integration of the anti-poverty and social 
exclusion guideline in Europe 2020 is a noteworthy 
new element, it is difficult to argue that it signposts 
a significant step towards strengthening “Social 
Europe”. The Commission’s stance (European 
12  Unless otherwise stated, all statistics are taken from the 
Eurostat webpages at  <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>  
Commission, 2010a) testifies to this in that, on the 
one hand it urges MS to embrace in their budgets 
the thematic targets set in EU 2020, but on the 
other hand it makes clear that spending on these 
thematic components should take place under 
conditions that closely follow the fiscal stipulations 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. The privileging 
of macro-economic stability over all other targets 
is clearly manifest in the Annual Growth Surveys 
(AGSs),13 particularly during the first cycles of the 
new “Strategy” (Natali, 2014). The mid-term review 
(in 2015), assessing progress with the new “Strategy”, 
showed the distance from the set target and 
prompted emphasis on the anti-poverty and social 
exclusion dimension, yet again in close connection 
with macro-economic and employment objectives. 
In this vein, the 2016 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
stresses that: 
“More effective social protection systems 
are needed to confront poverty and social 
exclusion, while preserving sustainable 
public finances and incentives to work. Any 
such development will have to continue to 
ensure that the design of in-work benefits, 
unemployment benefits and minimum 
income schemes constitutes an incentive 
to enter the job market. Adequate and 
well-designed income support, such as 
unemployment benefits and minimum 
income schemes, allow those out of work to 
invest in job search and training, increasing 
their chances to find adequate employment 
that matches their skills” (European 
Commission, 2015: 12).
Strikingly, income poverty has proved extremely 
resistant to policies to counter it even before the 
Great Recession. Despite the comparatively high 
employment rates over the 2000s in many EU 
countries, up to the eruption of the crisis, there 
has been no decline in people experiencing relative 
poverty in the Union. On the contrary, income 
inequalities and in-work poverty have increased in 
many places (Cantillon, 2011). This indicates that a 
main focus on employment rates (as clearly indicated 
in the above quotation), without strategic efforts to 
13  As mentioned earlier, each year the AGS kickstarts the 
“European Semester”. It takes stock of what has been achieved 
with regard to the Europe 2020 targets so far and provides 
policy guidance to MS for the following year.  
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Table 2: The anti-poverty and social exclusion targets in the MS National Reform 
Programmes of 2011, 2014 & 2016 (26 MS) 
 
The targets set in the National Reform Programmes  
(starting point 2008 data) 
Commission 
forecast for 2020 
NRP 2011 NRP 2014 NRP 2016 2016* 
SE 
Reduce to well under 14% the number of 
people aged 20-64 who are not in the labour 
market (except full-time students), long-
term unemployed or on long-term sick leave 
The same as in 2011 The target has been reached (according to 2014 data the proportion of the population covered by the target was about 12.6%) 
DK Reduce the number of people in Hs** with low work intensity by 22,000 The same as in 2011 
The same as in 2011 - 
But the number of people in low-
work-intensity Hs increased by  
148,000 people from 2008  to 2014 
It will be challenging to meet 
the target 
FI AROPE reduction  by 150,000 The same as in 2011 
The same as 2011 – But the number 
of people at-risk-of-poverty & social 
exclusion has increased 
It will be challenging to meet 
the target 
NL Reduce the number of people in Hs with low work intensity by 93,000 The same as in 2011 
The same as in 2011 – But the 
number of people in low-work-
intensity Hs increased by 67,000  
from 2008 (starting point) to 2014 
---- 
DE 
Reduce the number of long-term 
unemployed by 320,000 (20% reduction, 
2008 base year) 
Between 2008 and 
2014, the number of the 
long-term unemployed 
decreased by around 
44% 
The target has already been met 
AT AROPE reduction  by 235,000 The same as in 2011 The AROPE number  decreased by 90,000 from 2008  to 2014 ---- 
FR 
Durable reduction of poverty by one third 
(approx. 1,600,000 people) between 2007 
and 2012 
No new target  
The number of people at-risk-of-
poverty cumulatively increased by 
389,000 (2008-2014) 
A new national multi-year 
plan (2015-2017) to fight 
poverty – No clear new target 
BE AROPE reduction  by 380,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 – But the AROPE number has increased 
A larger reduction is required 
for meeting the target 
UK 
None  
[Reference to existing numerical targets of 
the 2010 Child Poverty Act] 
None (between 2013 and 2014 the AROPE rate decreased 
slightly) ---- 
IE Reduce the number of people in persistent poverty from 6.2% to 2% by 2020 
The same as in 2011 (the AROPE number remains well above the 
pre-crisis level) 
Achieving the national target 
remains ambitious  
IT AROPE reduction by 2,200,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 No progress,  the situation has deteriorated 
ES AROPE reduction  by 1,400,000 – 1,500,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 No progress, the situation has deteriorated 
PT AROPE reduction  by 580,000 The same as in 2011 
The AROPE  number rose by 170,000 
between 2010 and 2014 – New 
target: AROPE reduction by 200,000 
people between 2008 and 2020 
The target remains far from 
reach 
CY AROPE reduction  by 27,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 – But the AROPE number is on the increase 
The target seems far from 
reach 
MT AROPE reduction  by 6,560 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 No progress towards achieving the target 
CZ AROPE reduction  by 30,000 The same as in 2011 
The AROPE number decreased by 
34,000 people from 2008 to 2014 – 
New target: AROPE reduction by 
100,000 between 2008 and 2020  
---- 
HU AROPE reduction  by 450,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 
Some progress between 2013 
and 2014, but the AROPE 
number still much higher than 
the 2008  baseline 
PL AROPE reduction  by 1,500,000 Since 2008, the AROPE number has been continuously reduced – The target has been achieved 
SI AROPE reduction  by 40,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 
After several years of 
deterioration, poverty and 
social exclusion rates 
stabilized in 2014 
SK AROPE reduction  by 170,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011  The AROPE number is on the decrease  
EE Reduction of the at-risk-of-poverty rate to 15% (about 62,000 people) The same as in 2011 (the rate has increased) 
The target seems far from 
reach 
LV 
Reduction of the number of  people at-risk-
of-poverty and/or living in jobless Hs by 
121,000 
The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 
Inadequate social assistance 
prevents effective poverty 
reduction 
 
LT AROPE reduction  by 170,000 The target has been met 
BG 
Reduction of the number of people at-risk-
of-poverty by 260,000 between 2008 and 
2020 
The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 More efforts will be needed to attain the target 
RO AROPE reduction  by 200,000 The same as in 2011 The same as in 2011 The target remains far from reach 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the information provided by the NRPs and the CRs, in 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/index_en.htm> accessed 30 September 2016. 
Note: * Refers to 2014 Eurostat data; **Hs=households - The dark grey colour indicates the countries that 
opted for a different target, and the light grey colour the countries that have chosen only one or two of the 
constituents of the AROPE indicator. Greece is omitted because, since 2010, the country has been under a 
stability support programme and is not included in the EU Semester process. 
[European country code abbreviations: Austria=AT; Belgium=BE; Bulgaria=BG; Cyprus=CY; Czech 
Republic=CZ; Denmark=DK; Estonia=EE; Finland=FI; France=FR; Germany=DE; Greece=EL; Hungary=HU; 
Ireland=IE; Italy=IT; Latvia=LV; Lithuania=LT; Malta=MT; Netherlands=NL; Poland=PL; Portugal=PT; 
Romania=RO; Slovakia=SK; Slovenia=SI; Spain=ES; Sweden=SE; United Kingdom=UK] 
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improve the quality of jobs, balance flexibility with 
security and promote equality of opportunity as well 
as income, appear to be misguided, even at times 
of prosperity, let alone in a period of protracted 
slow recovery (and in some MS – e.g. Greece – of 
persistent crisis). Moreover, recent academic debate 
provides ample evidence of the negative effects of 
poverty and inequality on growth (Piketty, 2014; 
Stiglitz, 2014).
Given the controversies on the social component 
of Europe 2020, Copeland and Daly (2014) authors 
consider the poverty and social exclusion target 
as “effectively ungovernable”. This is argued on 
the grounds of: (a) the “ideational incoherence” 
characterizing the three constituent elements of the 
indicator (and the varying approaches to poverty 
and social exclusion underlying them, as indicated 
above); (b) “insufficient political prioritisation”; and 
(c) inadequacies in the monitoring procedure. Other 
authors (Vanhercke, 2013; Bekker, 2014; Urquijo, 
2017) also stress the limited role of the social 
dimension in the new governance structure of the 
EU. Yet they express a more optimistic view as to 
the possibility of strengthening complementarities 
between macro-economic, fiscal and social 
coordination in the future.
However, as disenchantment with the EU is 
spreading in many MS, the prospects for resolving 
the acute tensions around EU-wide redistribution 
are dim. The more so, as public opinion in favour 
of returning powers from Brussels to national 
parliaments is gaining momentum: according to 
a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre, 
about 42% of people in nine EU countries (Poland, 
Germany, Hungary, the UK, Sweden, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Greece) strongly expressed 
such a view.14
Table 2 shows the targets set in the national 
programmes in the first, fourth and sixth cycle of 
the EU 2020 Strategy. We see that four countries 
opted for a national target that differs from the 
AROPE indicator. Sweden defined the national 
target as the reduction of the number of people aged 
20-64 who are not in the labour market [except 
full-time students], whether they are long-term 
14  See the survey results at <http://www.pewglobal.
org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/> accessed 20 
October 2016.
unemployed or on long-term sick leave. Germany 
focused on the long-term unemployed; the UK on 
the numerical targets of the 2010 Child Poverty 
Act; and Ireland on consistent poverty (i.e. people 
combining at-risk-of-poverty and deprivation). 
Also five countries have chosen one or two of the 
constituent components of the target: for instance 
Denmark opted for a reduction of people living in 
jobless households and Latvia chose a combination 
of the income poverty and joblessness components 
of the EU target. Obviously it is difficult to calculate 
whether the national targets add up to the EU-wide 
target of reducing the number of people at-risk-of-
poverty and social exclusion by 20 million.15
Interestingly, the Commission’s forecast (shown in 
Table 2) hardly hinges upon this issue, as its focus 
is wholly on the expectation of attaining the target 
each MS has set in its national plan. Even so, in the 
majority of MS the Commission forecasts that the 
targets are difficult to meet - with the exception of 
Sweden and Germany, which have already attained 
their nationally specific targets, and Poland, 
on which the Commission comments that the 
reduction achieved is mainly the result of growth 
in market incomes, as the social protection system 
underperforms on poverty reduction.16 The large 
scope of flexibility for MS to interpret and integrate 
the target into their national policies corroborates 
the argument about the weaknesses in applying it. 
This clearly discloses the ideational and political 
impediments among MS to agree on a common 
approach for defining the problem, setting policy 
priorities and monitoring progress. Noticeably, 
even though the Commission’s documents record 
the intensification of poverty and social exclusion 
phenomena in many EU countries and express 
doubts as to whether the set targets can be reached, 
the core recommendations to MS do not clearly raise 
this issue, as we shall see below. 
Assessing performance so far
What do the data indicate?
The AROPE rate increased sharply between 2008 
and 2012, as did the absolute number of persons at-
15  Copeland and Daly (2012: 282) estimated that, in 2011, 
there was a gap of about 5 million people in the EU 2020 target.
16  See  the CSRs of 2016 for Poland in <http://ec.europa.
eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-
recommendations/index_en.htm> accessed 8 September 2016.  
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risk-of-poverty and social exclusion (Figures 2 & 3). 
Since then the AROPE rate has slightly decreased 
among the EU27 countries, but remains higher 
than the pre-crisis level. Among the EU15 countries 
a steady upward trend is observed. In absolute 
numbers, the cumulative increase from 2008 
onwards, among the 27 member countries, amounts 
to a little over 5 million people, while among the 15 
member countries it is close to 8.5 million. The lower 
cumulative increase, which arises if we take the 
27 member countries, is explained by the fact that 
some countries of the 2004 and later enlargements 
of the EU (e.g. Poland, Bulgaria and Romania), 
with widespread poverty, have exhibited a slight 
improvement. Nevertheless, they are still among the 
countries with the highest incidence of poverty and 
social exclusion (see Figures 4 & 5). On the other 
hand, in most of the older member states we observe 
an alarming rise in these phenomena.
If we disaggregate AROPE into its constituent parts, 
we observe that monetary (or income) poverty has 
been on the increase in both groups of MS since 
2008, and trends overlap. The slightly different 
trends with regard to the AROPE indicator, between 
EU27 and EU15, are mainly caused by the sharp 
increase of people experiencing severe material 
deprivation and/or living in households with low 
work intensity in a number of the old MS. Evidently, 
a dramatic fall in incomes (as for instance in Greece, 
Ireland, Cyprus and Spain, where the monetary 
poverty threshold fell by 30%, 15%, 10% and 4%, 
respectively, between 2008 and 2014/15) is not 
reflected in the relative (income) poverty indicator. 
Rather, an abrupt fall in living standards of a large 
part of the population results in a lower (relative) 
poverty rate. In this case severe material deprivation 
better reflects the geography of poverty across 
the EU. Moreover, the gap between the highest 
and lowest relative poverty threshold across the 
EU (calculated in Purchasing Power Standards) 
increased between 2008 and 2014. In EU15, the 
highest threshold was 2 times the lowest in 2008, 
but increased to 2.5 in 2014.
The countries that have been hardest and longest 
hit by the crisis (i.e. those of the southern European 
periphery and Ireland) exhibit the highest rate of 
increase of the number of people at-risk-of-poverty 
and social exclusion between 2008 and 2014 (Figure 
4). Strikingly, also MS such as Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands (the bastions of the social 
 
 
Figure 2: The AROPE rate (2006-2014) Figure 3: People at-risk-of-poverty and 
 social exclusion (absolute numbers) 
 (2006-2014) 
   
Source (Figures 2 & 3): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-
conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 3 September 2016.      
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democratic welfare state in Europe; see Esping-
Andersen 1990) experienced a significant increase 
in the absolute number of persons at-risk-of-poverty 
and social exclusion, as well as in the AROPE 
rate, between 2008 and 2014: in Sweden and the 
Netherlands from 15% in 2008 to about 17% in 2014, 
and in Denmark from 16% to 18% (Figure 5 depicts 
the rates in 2014). Yet, in close connection with 
what we mentioned above, in the countries with 
the highest AROPE rates (mostly Ireland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) severe 
material deprivation and joblessness characterize 
a comparatively large part of the population. In 
contrast to that, in the countries with the lowest 
AROPE rate (e.g. Sweden) in the EU, relative poverty 
is the dominant constituent of the AROPE rate, with 
severe material deprivation and joblessness being a 
less pronounced phenomenon.     
The significant fall in living standards in a number 
of countries is also evident if we look at the relative 
poverty rate anchored at a fixed moment in time, 
namely at the poverty threshold of 2008 (Figure 6). 
Greece stands out, as close to 50% of the population 
fell below the 2008 poverty line in 2014 (compared to 
about 20% in 2008). A sharp rise also characterizes 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland. Smaller increases 
are observed in Germany and the Netherlands. In 
Sweden, France and the UK, no major changes are 




Figure 2: The AROPE rate (2006-2014) Figure 3: People at-risk-of-poverty and 
 social exclusion (absolute numbers) 
 (2006-2014) 
   
Source (Figures 2 & 3): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-
conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 3 September 2016.      
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Figure 5: The AROPE rate and the rate of monetary poverty (2014) 
 
Source (Figures 4 & 5): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-
conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 3 September 2016.   
 
 
Figure 6: The relative poverty rate anchored at the 2008 threshold  
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The poverty gap has also significantly widened in 
a number of countries: e.g. in the South European 
countries, from about 25% in mid-2000s to over 
30% in 2014/15. It remains comparatively high in 
most East and Central European countries, as well 
as in Bulgaria and Romania. In the older member 
countries of North-West Europe no significant 
changes are observed, with the exception of 
Germany and Austria where there is a noticeable 
increase.
The widening poverty gap indicates a rise in 
inequality, corroborated by an increase in the      
S80/S20 ratio (namely the ratio between the top 
and bottom income quintiles, see Figure 7) in most 
MS, and particularly among the countries of the 
southern European periphery. However, a noticeable 
increase is also observed in a number of North-West 
European countries (e.g. in Germany, Denmark 
and Sweden). In a few countries of the eastern EU 
enlargement inequality decreased considerably (e.g. 
in Poland), but in others it either remained stable 
or even increased (e.g. in Hungary, Slovakia and 
Lithuania). The latter indicates that growth in the 
poorer new member states, which in the last few 
years has been higher compared to the older MS, has 
Figure 5: The AROPE rate and the rate of monetary poverty (2014) 
 
Source (Figures 4 & 5): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europ .eu/e rostat/web/income- nd-living-
conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 3 Septemb r 2016.   
 
 
Figure 6: The relative poverty rate anchored at the 2008 threshold  
































































































































































Figure 7: Income inequality within MS (S80/S20 ratio, 2005 & 2014/15) 
     
Source (Figures 6 & 7): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-
living-conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 10 September 2016. 
 
 
Figure 8: Income inequality across the EU (S80/S20) 
 
Source: Eurostat accessed in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-
and-living-conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 10 September 2016 
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hardly helped improve equity in most of them.       
Income inequality across the EU has also 
significantly increased since the mid-2000s. 
According to Eurostat data based on the average of 
the S80/S20 ratios of all EU MS (without taking into 
account the differences in the standards of living 
among MS), the ratio of the richest to the poorest 
quintile has been around 5.0, with a slight rise to 5.2 
in recent years. However, as Dauderstädt and Keltek 
(2016) argue, the official statistics by Eurostat tend to 
underestimate inequality in the EU. If quintiles are 
calculated for the EU27 as a whole and incomes are 
measured in PPS (Figure. 8), a different picture of 
deeper inequality emerges.17  
Against the backdrop of these trends, we will briefly 
discuss the monitoring process of the poverty 
and social exclusion guideline of the EU 2020 
Strategy, with an emphasis on the most recent 
country-specific recommendations and the role of 
supranational anti-poverty actors and stakeholders.
17  According to these authors, the reason why in the last few 
years the higher growth rates of the poorer countries do not 
reduce EU-wide inequality, is “because incomes in the poorest 
EU quintile did not grow faster than incomes in the richest. In 
fact, both hardly changed (less than half a percentage point), 
which in itself limits the scope for progress”. 
The visibility of poverty issues 
During the first cycles of the new “Strategy”, there 
was scarce reference to poverty issues. The focus 
on economic and fiscal consolidation in the years 
following the Great Recession of the late 2000s 
dominated the monitoring process of EU 2020. Even 
though the austerity mantra is still preponderant, 
an attempt to address the imbalance with regard 
to the social and employment targets of EU 2020 
is evident in the Commission’s documents of the 
following years. The social issues gained visibility 
particularly after 2015, when the mid-term review 
of the “Strategy” took place and the Commission 
undertook the task to prepare, annually, a country 
report (CR) commenting on progress with regard 
to the EU 2020 indicators (and the country-specific 
targets) in each MS. The CRs constitute a new key 
milestone in the annual monitoring process by 
providing a significant input into the drafting of the 
country-specific recommendations at the closing of 
the yearly cycle. 
Figure 7: Income inequality within MS (S80/S20 ratio, 2005 & 2014/15) 
     
Source (Figures 6 & 7): Eurostat data in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-
living-conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 10 September 2016. 
 
 
Figure 8: Income inequality across the EU (S80/S20) 
 
Source: Eurostat accessed in <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-
and-living-conditions/statistics-illustrated> accessed 10 September 2016 
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Table 3 very briefly summarizes the main 
emphasis of the 2016 CRs and CSRs, in respect 
to social and employment issues. The problem 
of increasing poverty levels and inequality is 
acknowledged for the majority of the member 
countries (with the exception of Austria, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark and Finland). 
But, even in the countries with the highest level 
of poverty incidence (e.g. Romania, Latvia), the 
“Recommendations” do not directly point to 
poverty reduction. They rather subsume it under 
the need to improve education/skills and labour 
market access among disadvantaged groups (e.g. 
Roma, long-term unemployed, young people not 
in education, employment or training). The need 
to address poverty is explicitly articulated as a 
recommendation only in the case of Bulgaria, 
Ireland and Italy (in Ireland, the focus is on child 
poverty, while in Italy the recommendation refers 
to the need to rationalize social spending with the 
development of a national anti-poverty strategy).
The low redistribution effect of social protection in 
most South and East European countries is only 
marginally touched upon (e.g. in the case of Poland 
it is stressed that “the social protection system 
is ineffective”, see Table 3).18  On the other hand, 
in this latter group of countries the CSRs point 
to the need to improve the quality of and access 
to social services (i.e. childcare, so as to facilitate 
women’s employment either as a second earner in 
the household, or a sole earner in single-parent 
households), and develop social assistance. Overall, 
however, the hard core of recommendations in the 
social and employment fields focus mainly on labour 
market issues (strengthening of activation measures, 
linking social security to activation, reducing 
disincentives to work) and on education (improving 
VET, training and life-long learning, and addressing 
skill mismatches). Moreover, in the countries with 
the highest AROPE indicators (as shown in Figure 
5 above), the policy measure strongly advocated 
is the minimum income scheme (i.e. improve its 
18  A report commissioned by the European Parliament 
in 2014 with the aim of tracking the main themes of EC 
documents monitoring the structural adjustment plans in 
Greece, shows that “in a total of about 2,000 pages of EC 
programme documents on Greece, the term ‘poverty’ is 
mentioned 59 times, while there is only one reference to 
inequality” (referred to in Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015: 165; 
see also Sapir et al., 2014 for the report on both Greece and 
Portugal under the stability support programme).
effectiveness, link it with activation etc.). As to major 
social protection fields, such as pensions and health 
care, these are discussed in close relation with fiscal 
sustainability (and are thus not included in Table 
3).19
These findings lend support to the view of the 
poor effectiveness of the EU 2020 governance 
structure in relation to the anti-poverty dimension, 
discussed by studies at an early stage of the 
”Strategy’s” implementation (see, among others, 
Pochet, 2010; Frazer and Marlier, 2012; Peña-Casas, 
2012; Copeland and Daly, 2012). Nevertheless, 
the inclusion of an anti-poverty target in the new 
“Strategy”, even in a very flexibly articulated way, 
and the iterative monitoring process involving 
national/local and supranational actors has opened 
up a crucial Europeanized public space for debate. 
Since the first years of the new “Strategy”, the 
worsening poverty has prompted a critical response 
by the “most socially oriented” supranational actors, 
such as the Directorate for Employment and Social 
Affairs of the Commission, the EU Social Protection 
and Employment Committees, as well as the 
European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), the Social 
Platform (for European NGOs) and other similar 
bodies calling for a strengthening of the anti-poverty 
dimension and reinforcing of EU governance in this 
respect (Jessoula 2015: 495). The “European Platform 
against Poverty and Social Exclusion” (which is one 
of Europe’s flagship initiatives; see Table 1 above) 
contributed to this by broadening consultation at 
various levels and promoting synergies between 
national and supranational actors.20 Notably, in 2013 
a broad coalition was formed that brought together 
a number of major European NGOs and trade union 
organizations under the lead of EAPN (the so-called 
“European Alliance for a Democratic, Social and 
Sustainable European Semester”, thereafter the 
“Alliance”)21, with the aim of engaging in a dialogue 
19  With the exception of Cyprus where the recommendations 
include reference to a health care reform for universal coverage 
that has been pending for over a decade. 
20  Nevertheless, according to Sabato and Vanhercke (2014), 
the “Platform’s” impact has been rather limited, as it lacks the 
necessary structure and processes to feed into the European 
Semester. The authors suggest the boosting of the “Platform’s” 
effectiveness by becoming “the hub for discussing the social 
dimension in Europe”, “the bridge with the European 
Semester”, and even “Social Europe’s watchdog”.
21  See <https://semesteralliance.net/the-alliance-partners/> 
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under the European Semester process with national 
and international actors and increasing the visibility 
of the social dimension. The “Alliance” indicates 
some signs of change in the AGS, particularly since 
2015, in the claims for strengthening the social 
dimension (for instance, in the 2016 AGS, the 
reference to “social investment” calling on member 
states to invest in health, social care, and housing 
support; see European Commission, 2015: 9). 
However, it also emphasizes that “there is still a long 
way to go towards a democratic, social, sustainable 
and inclusive Europe” (European Alliance, 2015: 1). 
This is argued with respect to the fact that reference 
to growing inequalities, poverty and social exclusion 
“are squeezed into the narrow labour-market 
driven framework in which all and those furthest 
away are expected to ‘adapt’ when in fact it should 
be the other way around” (ibid.). This reiterates 
the dominant mantra of the Commission, namely 
“structural reforms” for growth and jobs.
Similar criticisms are also raised by ETUI (see 
Pochet, 2010) in relation to AGS’ lip service to 
precarious work, while on the other hand MS are 
called on to increase labour market flexibility that 
erodes labour standards and increases insecurity. 
Pochet utterly doubts that the poverty and social 
exclusion target can be reached “by an exchange of 
good practices and by creating a platform for such 
an exchange” (ibid: 4). Moreover, he considers the 
aim itself non-viable and incompatible with the 
criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, the more 
so as no significant changes in the distribution 
of income and mechanisms of redistribution are 
forthcoming. Interestingly, this view is corroborated 
by the following statement in a short note by the EU 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs:   
“As regards the poverty target, its 
achievability will crucially depend on 
its definition. In particular, the relative 
measures of poverty do not generally 
change over time significantly and a very 
important policy shift would be needed in 
some countries to achieve progress on this 
target” (European Commission, 2010b).  
The “Alliance” advocates the strengthening of social 
rights vis-à-vis economic rights and advances a plea 
accessed 15 September 2016.
to the Commission for a social rights pillar, which 
clearly defines and supports social standards and 
ensures the congruence of the macro-economic, 
fiscal and job creation framework with a rights-
based approach (European Alliance, 2015). The 
increasing stakeholder mobilization and political 
pressure at the supranational and national level, in 
parallel with the support of a “social investment” 
perspective by some EU bodies (e.g. the Directorate 
for Employment and Social Affairs)22 could be seen 
as promising developments for tackling what some 
authors have called “excessive social imbalances” in 
the EU (Vandenbroucke, 2014: 9).   
In this context, in March 2016, the Commission 
issued a draft for a “European Pillar of Social 
Rights” (EPSR) and launched a public consultation 
in order to “assess the present EU social acquis”, 
“to reflect on new trends in work patterns and 
societies” and “to gather views and feedback” on the 
principles identified in the preliminary draft from 
other European institutions, national authorities, 
social partners and others.23 The initiative is a 
reaction to the detrimental effects caused by the 
Euro crisis management and growing scepticism 
regarding the social dimension of EU 2020.  The 
“European Pillar” is targeted at the Euro zone, but 
other MS can also join. However, notwithstanding 
its ambitious rhetoric to place social monitoring 
on an equal footing with macro-economic and 
financial surveillance in the European Semester, 
it rather vaguely envisions this. The document 
aims at gathering feedback around three main 
themes: (a) stocktaking of the EU “social acquis”, 
(b) reflecting upon the future of work and the 
challenges and opportunities facing welfare systems, 
and (c) mapping out how a “European Pillar” 
could contribute to a deeper and fairer European 
Union (European Commission, 2016). Three major 
policy areas are distinguished as relevant under the 
“Pillar”: “equal opportunities and access to labour 
22   The “social investment” perspective relies on policies 
that can raise human capital and enhance people’s capacity 
to participate in social and economic life (with labour market 
participation being a prominent aspect); see Bouget et al., 2015.
23  See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-544_en.htm> accessed 12 September 2016.  A 
first outline was announced by President Juncker in 
September 2015 (<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=2487&furtherNews=yes>) 
accessed 30 September 2016. The online consultation run until 
the end of 2016.
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markets”, “fair working conditions” and “adequate 
and sustainable social protection”. Under these three 
headings twenty policy domains are laid out with 
different principles attached to them. However, a 
careful reading shows that all these policy domains 
point to rights already inscribed in the EU hard and 
soft law provisions. As a critical author stresses:
 “The legal basis on which the EPSR 
rests already has the status of quasi-
constitutional primary law. Yet, those 
provisions have not prevented the EU from 
ignoring, circumventing and even directly 
violating fundamental social rights. Thus, 
the real problem is not the legal status of 
existing provisions but the total and wilful 
ignorance of these principles” (Seikel, 2016).
Surely, if this initiative could open up the way 
for an effective operationalization of many of 
the principles and rights already inscribed in EU 
and other relevant sources of law, this would be a 
highly promising development towards meeting 
the challenges of the EU poverty and social 
exclusion target. Yet, if this were the case, a clear 
plan with specific indicators to monitor, measure 
and compare member states’ social performance 
with respect to the major principles and rights 
of the “Pillar” is required. However, so far, this is 
missing from the Commission’s initiative. Even 
though the Commission’s document refers to the 
need for adequate and sustainable social protection 
systems, both terms (“adequate” and “sustainable”) 
are vaguely defined, with the latter ultimately 
denoting the subordination of basic social rights 
to fiscal and competitiveness considerations (ibid.). 
Issues related to solidarity-based social security and 
risk-pooling do not get much attention, and nor 
does the idea of developing clear-cut indicators for 
operationalizing the existing social principles of the 
“acquis”. One such indicator that could signpost a 
significant step in the direction of social integration 
could be the existence or not of a “social protection 
floor” in member countries. This would be defined 
as a provision of “sufficient resources” to people 
without adequate income from work, pension or 
other welfare provision in order for them “to cover 
the true costs of food, accommodation, clothing, 
water, energy and basic healthcare (see Sanden 
and Schlüter, 2016).  This would be a significant 
development in truly promoting a European level 
social integration. Yet, so far, there are no clear 
indications of the Commission following such a 
route, particularly as the thematic scope of the 
“Pillar” tends to stick to the formulation of social 
rights in a “market-compatible way”, which is in 
tandem with austerity policies under the Euro 
rescue. 
Concluding remarks
In October 2014, in his speech to the European 
Parliament, the European Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker expressed his wish for a 
“Social Triple A” rating for Europe. Achieving 
the anti-poverty headline target of Europe 2020 
and progressing with binding commitments to 
EU-wide redistribution could support this vision.  
However, the brief review of the political dynamics 
characterizing the negotiations for the EU 2020 
social objectives disclosed deep and persistent 
tensions and diverse perspectives among MS and the 
major supranational actors. These greatly hindered 
consensus on a clear definition of the anti-poverty 
target and on whether and how compliance with 
it should be monitored and assessed.  Against 
a backdrop of steadily rising poverty, material 
deprivation and inequality, and absence of 
commonly agreed commitments by the MS, meeting 
even the flexibly articulated anti-poverty target 
seems unrealistic.    
The governance structure of the EU 2020 Strategy 
has prompted multi-stakeholder engagement 
in the monitoring process and opened up a 
Europeanized anti-poverty arena through increasing 
stakeholder mobilization and political pressure 
at the supranational and national level. This may 
have increased the visibility of the social field 
within EU policy-making, but we are still far from 
envisaging a binding commitment for effective 
welfare provision across Europe. The launching of 
the debate for a “European Pillar of Social Rights” 
provides a significant opportunity for developing 
a counterweight to the economic rationale that 
has dominated EU governance. In order for this 
opportunity not to be wasted, the “Pillar” should 
expand the “social acquis” by establishing social 
rights rather than simply referring to social policy 
guidelines and principles, as is the case with the 
Commission’s draft. Most importantly, it must 
prioritize objectives such as equity, accessibility and 
quality of provisions, and not primarily tie social 
objectives to a market-driven approach. 
In the light of this, and given the deepening poverty 
and social exclusion in many parts of Europe, 
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renewed policy commitments and efforts at various 
levels (local, national, EU) are needed in order to 
make a substantial impact on these phenomena in 
the medium term. Important in this respect would 
be the following: (a) To seek agreement on the 
proportional assignment of the poverty and social 
exclusion target, whereby countries/regions with the 
largest incidence of poverty and social exclusion are 
prompted to make a substantial reduction in this 
respect, and to deploy EU funds accordingly. (b) To 
come to an agreement on setting sub-targets by age 
(e.g. child/youth poverty, old-age poverty), gender 
and population groups (e.g. Roma, migrants).  (c) 
To focus national efforts on lifting out of poverty 
people who are well below the poverty and social 
exclusion threshold and not only those around it 
(what Walker [2010] calls the “creaming effect”). 
(d) To strengthen social inclusion governance by 
systematically assessing the social impact of all 
policies of the macro-economic, fiscal and thematic 
strands of EU 2020. Finally, introducing elements 
of an EU-wide social redistribution, for example, 
in the form of unemployment compensation 
that rests upon redistribution between member 
states, triggered in times of economic crisis as an 
automatic stabilizer (Andor, 2016; see also Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2013 on a minimum European pension), 
could be a significant step towards promoting the 
social dimension in the EU. However, as long as 
the “European Pillar” articulates social rights as 
general principles rather than as enforceable rights, 
it is highly unlikely that the Commission’s initiative 
will encourage a growing momentum in the Union 
towards delivering on the social targets of the EU 
2020. Albeit, the scenarios of a two-speed or multi-
speed Europe that have recently resurfaced in the 
debate - triggered by the Commission’s White Paper 
(2017) on the post-Brexit future of the EU - do not 
leave much scope for optimism.
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